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Will You Awaken When Your Netflix
No Longer Works? American Films,
Television Productions and Social
Transformations in Poland
Mirosław Filiciak
1 “Freedom. What do you need freedom for? You’ve got TV.” Thus begins “Po co wolność”
(“Freedom? What For?”), a song by Kult, one of the most popular bands in the history of
Polish  rock  music.  It  comes  from  their  1989  album  titled  Kaseta  (Cassette),  a  highly
suggestive name in the context of this essay as it refers to the main medium of music
distribution used at the time. Like most Kult songs, the lyrics provide a commentary on
the  social  and  political  situation  in  Poland,  and  the  above  quoted  words  from  the
beginning of the song are followed by examples of how the authorities (still communist at
the time) bribed the citizens with little comforts. It is not by chance that the TV opens the
list here and that the rest of the song, which includes “a gratuitous ration of spirit,” there
are abundant references to TV shows. As Iwona Kurz, the historian of Polish culture,
notes, in the 1970s and 80s popular culture images of Polish TV were unambiguous. It was
represented as a tool for escapism and mass hallucinations (Kurz 390). Yet, these images
related  mostly  to  the  propagandistic  role  of  the  national  TV,  filled  with  programs
produced by Poland and the Comecon countries. The audiences’ reception of what came
from behind the Iron Curtain was entirely different.
2 In this essay, I will discuss the historical transformations of the status of access to TV and
cinema  content  in  Poland  from  the  1980s  till  today.  However,  I  will  not  focus  on
particular  shows  but  will,  instead,  bring  them  under  the  common  denominator  of
American productions. My main interest will lie in the models of access to this content.
Sonia Livingstone and Ranjana Das’ research will constitute my major point of reference
here.  As  they argue,  if,  according to the Anglo-American tradition of  cultural  studies, 
media is both texts and objects, then audiences likewise have a double nature: they read
texts  but  they  also  re-produce  social  relations  (Livingstone  and  Das  105-106).  I  will
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explore  here  the  status  nature  of  such  reproduction  and  the  dynamics  of  its
transformations. The local aspect of my analysis will, of course, be of great importance
here, especially in the context of Polish audiences’ encounter with American content. I
will look at how the mythologized West, which was an important point of reference for
Poles and was identified with American productions in the realm of popular culture,
functioned during and after the political transformations. I will also explore which types
of encounter with American audiovisual content have been perceived as productive of
prestige.
3 Referring to cinema and TV productions made in USA is important not only because of the
role  the  US  has  played  as  a  world  production  center  but  also  in  the  context  of  a
phenomenon  which  Alexandr  Kiossev  describes  as  self-colonization:  an  uncritical
fascination with the West driven by the fear of one’s own peripheral status (Kiossev). This
is hegemony without domination, a situation which is the opposite, or perhaps a mirror
reflection, of the relation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the “East”
personified  by  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Soviet  Union  had  successfully  imposed  its
domination on Poland for over four decades; accordingly, in the social imagination it
retained the status of an aggressor. The West enjoyed a different status: Poles yielded to it
voluntarily, even with enthusiasm in terms of culture and politics. We can see this in the
overwhelming majority of elites’ uncritical attitude towards to the shock therapy (a US
import, to a large extent) given to our country after 1989. The elites have remained, until
today, impervious to any discussion about economic models alternative to neoliberalism.
4 I thus adopt here a cultural studies perspective in which not only content, but also, and
even primarily, the ways of accessing it and the social practices linked to it are of crucial
importance.  Since in this short essay I  will  analyze transformations beginning in the
1980s and lasting until today, interpreting particular films or series would miss the point
and  would  provide  only  anecdotal  evidence  for  my  arguments.  Analyzing  types  of
content, and especially the ways of distributing it to viewers, is justified given the fact
that access to audiovisual content, not only in Poland, has undergone significant changes
over the last three decades, mainly due to technological progress. The arrival of the VCR
and satellite TV in the 1980s loosened state control over the circulation of the content but
also became a point of reference for the aspirations of the culture of consumption of
those times. Beginning with a historical outline, I discuss how the changing technological
platforms have continued to express the aspirations and identity of its users despite the
political change in Poland and the processes of globalization.
 
1. Going to Movies or… the VCR Show?
5 During the Polish People’s Republic, access to American content was severely restricted.
US  films,  as  well  as  American  TV  series,  reached  Poland  in  meager  amounts,  often
considerably delayed and, obviously, selective. They almost always achieved considerable
success, which is at odds with the image of those times cultivated by Polish intelligentsia.
As Arkadiusz Lewicki shows, the dominant image of the cinema audiences in the Polish
People’s Republic who, or so it is often assumed, watched ambitious films and abundantly
participated in film societies, finds no confirmation in statistics (46). Lewicki also notes
that the interest in Polish and European cinema, so often evoked today, can at least partly
be treated as caused by lack of access to American productions. In 1964, a year of record
attendance, Hollywood films constituted a mere 15% of the cinema programs in Poland.
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Afterwards, the percentage was sometimes higher, yet Hollywood productions continued
to be meted out, sparingly and selectively, by the communist authorities.
6 However, it was already by the mid-1980s that the state began to lose control over what
Poles were watching. This loss was mostly caused by the boom of the VHS. It was then
that the culture of viewership began to develop. American films (often of poor technical
quality caused by multiple copying) and access to devices which enhanced the status of
their owners were significant elements of this culture. The status in question was not
only  material.  Possessing  a  VCR,  or  at  least  having access  to  it,  called  for  financial
resources  which  in  the  Polish  People’s  Republic  were  inextricably  linked  with
resourcefulness, something valued immensely in Polish culture. In a radically centralized
economy, both preferential access to commodities and opportunities to increase one’s
revenue required a network of contacts and an ability to move skillfully within it. Though
such a comparison may be overdrawn, we can note here certain analogies to how the
VCRs functioned in other countries, semi-peripheral or peripheral from the perspective
of the economic center. I am referring here to Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems
theory which segments the world on the basis of division of labor. Core countries use
higher-skill production, while periphery countries focus on labor-intense production and
extraction of raw materials. Semi-periphery countries have double characteristics and
mediate between centers and peripheries (Wallerstein). The division of labor and access
to products connected with it affect local cultures and peoples’ cultural practices built
around media. We could mention here  the  Salomon Islands,  discussed by  Jean-Marc
Philibert and Christine Jourdan (61). Seen as very prestigious electronic devices, the VCRs
were  not  always  used there  in  the  way intended by  the  manufacturers  because,  for
example,  the users did not have enough competence to operate them. What is more,
when the device broke down, it was frequently left unrepaired because of limited access
to  service  centers.  Yet  for  the  owners,  using  the  devices  did  not  need  to  be  more
important  than  the  prestige  derived  from possessing  them.  The  situation  in  Poland
seemed to be strikingly similar until the fall of the communist system.
7 In the first half of the 1980s, most VCRs which were available in Poland arrived through
what can be called “private import,” or, to be more precise, smuggling. Later, they were
sold, for dollars, by the state-owned chain stores Pewex and Baltona. It is estimated that
already by the mid-1980s, there were over half a million VCRs in Poland, and counting
(Gaweł 1). This figure is quite high given that at the beginning of the decade the VCR cost
an equivalent of an average salary of five years. Afterwards, it cost an equivalent of the
salary of several months. In order to obtain a possession of the VCR, resourcefulness was
also needed. It allowed people to increase the official salary and buy the VCR at a price
absurdly high from our viewpoint. What was also needed was the ability to mobilize the
reservoirs  of  knowledge  necessary  to  obtain  the  films  or  to  connect  the  devices
themselves  to  incompatible  color  systems  or  cables,  which  frequently  required
appropriate expertise. For this reason, home VCR screenings of American movies—often
organized for neighbors and friends—were in fact spectacles of the status of the hosts
with the VCR functioning as a medium of prestige. These aspirations corresponded with
the images shown in the films because in the social imagination of the Polish People’s
Republic the US was a country of widespread affluence based on the entrepreneurial
spirit of its citizens. The owners of the VCR saw themselves as doubly avant-garde: people
who in comparison to the rest of the population had an easier access to American pop
culture  but  also  as  people  who,  through  their  actions  and  abilities  to  make  money
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effectively, personified the Western spirit of resourcefulness and thus were closer not
simply  to  American  films,  but  to  the  American  way  of  life.  This,  by  the  way,  also
corresponds to the narrative which was dominant in the Polish People’s Republic, even in
the official media, a narrative about Poland’s backwardness and its constant chase after
the West. The VCRs allowed people to feel that the distance separating them from the
West got somewhat diminished. 
8 Films available on VHS cassettes covered a wide range, also because in the absence of
official distribution, the copies of films (disseminated mostly at the markets) belonged to
different types of circulation which were kept separate in their countries of origin. From
the  perspective  of  the  viewers  who  came  into  their  possession,  mostly  through  the
purchase or exchange of pirate copies, these differences were often imperceptible. In the
same place, often side by side on the same cassette, one could get not only action films,
but also a B horror movie and arthouse cinema. Porn movies, which became an essential
component of most home collections, acquired a unique status. This brief deregulation of
the cultural taboo resulted from the fact that watching porn movies was treated not only
as a manifestation of access to a new means of circulation, but also as circumvention of
moral censorship which was identified with up-to-datedness.  This censorship was not
only a result of the policies of the government, but also of the values propagated by the
Catholic church which supported the opposition. The confusion of the types of circulation
also occurred in the case of Polish productions. In the interviews I and Patryk Wasiak held
as part of our research on the social life of the VCR in Poland, we heard, among others, a
story told by a VCR fan who as a teenager, by the end of the 1980s, watched Ryszard
Bugajski’s Przesłuchanie (Interrogation, 1982). It may just as well be the most famous Polish
film banned from distribution (the film was  made in 1982 but  it  premiered only  on
December 13, 1989). An iconic film among those which leveled accusations against the
communist regime, it tells a story of a woman tortured by the Office of Public Security in
Stalinist Poland. When watched by a professional technical school student, it was mostly
seen as a Polish equivalent to the subgenre of the cinema of exploitation (“women in
prison”),  popular in VCR circulation. Even if this case is an anecdotic one (since it is
impossible to determine the range of similar interpretations today), it proves that at least
in some part of the society video fans derived pleasure from an erotic tension generated
by the tormenting of the female protagonist rather than from the evidence it provided
for the cruelty of the authorities. 
9 The raptures over the freedom inscribed into this channel of distribution began to wear
off rather fast by the end of the 1980s, which can clearly be seen in how the cultural elites
related to the VCR cassettes. Initially, they reached for the VCR mostly because they saw
it as a medium challenging and unsettling the state monopoly on the distribution of
information and cultural texts. Yet it was also seen as a medium which allowed people to
watch films such as the already mentioned Interrogation, and the most recent American
cinema. The VCR screenings were organized in the salons of the opposition intelligentsia.
It  soon  turned  out,  however,  that  although  the  new  technology  provided  access  to
content inaccessible in official circulation, it would also come to transform the entire
media and culture ecosystem. In the cinema and on TV, distribution was centralized—the
program  was  chosen  by  party  officials,  but  sometimes  also  by  the  cultural  elite
cooperating with media and cultural institutions. In the case of the VCR, it proved to be
entirely  different.  The  discouragement  is  perfectly  captured  in  Agnieszka  Osiecka’s
famous text “Wydeo” (the misspelling reflecting the mispronunciation of the word video),
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which was  published  in  Polityka,  a  Polish  weekly, in  1989.  The  VCR,  the  eponymous
“wydeo,” is represented as a symbol of the birth of the new middle class, wanting in taste
and  obsessively  watching  action  cinema  (the  article  obviously  cites  Rambo  starring
Sylvester Stallone). 
10 It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that  such processes  were  local  in  character.  Somewhat
belatedly, they also followed the phenomena one could encounter in the West. In his new
introduction to the influential 1979 book Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and
Evaluation of Taste, Herbert Gans mentions the media, including the VCRs, as a factor of
cultural divergence in the USA. Writing about “cultural wars” and the diversification of
tastes, Gans reminds us that they were, in fact, an element of class struggle in which the
VCR and computers played a significant role supporting the development of new cultural
niches  (3-25).  The  change  of  the  cinema  program,  but  especially  the  change  of  the
institutions regulating film distribution, became part of the symbolic struggles between
former  elites  and  the  new  middle  class  whose  economic  and  political  significance
continued to grow. It was thus in the interest of the middle class to enhance the cultural
competences which had hitherto remained outside the canon. Of course, bringing the US
and Poland into a comparative perspective calls for some clarification. At the turn of the
1970s and 80s, the American white middle-class still enjoyed the delusion of growth. In
Poland,  the consumerist  boom and the development of the management caste in the
1970s, vividly depicted, for instance, in the TV series Czterdziestolatek (dir. Jerzy Gruza,
1975), were brutally stopped already at the beginning of the 1980s when the martial law
was introduced.  The reduction of  the standard of  living and the awareness  that  the
authorities were capable of brutal acts provided the background to the VCR revolution in
Eastern Europe. This does not change the fact that there were internal tensions between
the existing elites (the intelligentsia managed to maintain such status in the times of the
Polish People’s Republic) and the new groups of economic advancement that aspired to
claim the position of the intelligentsia. 
11 In Poland, the tension over the extension of cultural capital (an extension taking place
under the pressure from groups gaining in economic strength but having limited high
culture  competence)  was  mostly  related  to  the  rhetorical  strategies  of  intelligentsia
attempting  to  defend  its  position  (this  process  is  still  visible  in  the  public  life;  see
Zarycki). At the moment, radical neoliberal economy began to gain ground, this group,
which  during  the  Polish  People’s  Republic  had  retained  a  strong  position  despite
censorship, now feared degradation at the hands of the new middle class. The middle
class had been burgeoning since the 1970s, but was relatively less educated and held a
different set of values. This paradox touched upon the ambivalent relationship with the
West which the Polish intelligentsia saw as an oasis of civil freedom antithetical to the
Soviet  Union,  on  the  one  hand,  but,  in  the  context  of  the  1980s/1990s  economic
transformations, also as a symbol of consumerism detrimental to high culture.
 
2. Pirate Modernisation in a Digital Mode
12 The modernization of Polish culture, described above, was of a “dirty” character which
brings to mind the transformations of Indian cities Ravi Sundaram has called “pirate
modernity” (see Sundaram). The term describes the modernization of public space in
which new media played a key role but which, despite this technological support, had an
improvised,  pirate character.  Simultaneously,  this  pirate character could be detached
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from the rhetoric of protest against the dominant system because what was at stake was
not only a break-up with the past, but also consumption within available means. Above
all, it was based on local innovations which combined new technological solutions with
grassroots  activities  focusing  on  the  reduction  of  access  costs.  This  involved,  in
particular, pirate copying and the development of a system for the circulation of copies.
However,  the  liberation  from  under  the  influence  of  the  Soviet  Union,  which  also
manifested itself in the realm of popular culture, fueled (as was the case in postcolonial
countries) new forms of entanglements. On the one hand, it meant a growing proximity
to  the  countries  of  the  economic  and  cultural  center,  a  proximity  mediated  by
technology; on the other, a simultaneous participation in their culture by means of pirate
solutions.  While  exploring  the  Nigerian  VCR  market,  Brian  Larkin  describes  this
phenomenon as the “colonial sublime,” that is, processes in which viewers who aspire to
enter  fully  the  realm  of  Western  pop  culture  at  the  same  time  use  the  equipment
imported from the West and maintain a conviction about the superiority of its implied
users  (Larkin  35-44).  In  the  case  of  the  VCR  pirate  market,  this  superiority  was
everywhere to be seen given the low quality of recordings, the poor quality of dubbing
superimposed on the original sound track, sometimes subtitles in foreign languages or
logotypes of Western TV stations one could see on the recordings. They made it clear to
the viewers that they were not the intended audience of the content and that this content
reached them only by way of an enforced recycling. They showed that the Polish audience
—despite the substantial costs they believed they had borne—remained incompatible with
the Western circulation of content;  just like the VCRs which coded colors in the PAL
system were incompatible  with Eastern European TVs which operated in the SECAM
system. 
13 It is clear, in the light of the argument presented in this essay, that the situation was
radically changed neither by the fall of communism (which did not, after all,  entail a
leveling out of economic differences) nor by the technological transformations. Each new
technology,  though holding  a  promise  of  egalitarianism,  continued to  reproduce  the
dependence  between  the  center  and  the  semi-peripheries  even  if  it  enabled  a  local
economy of prestige, itself enabling the production of differences within Polish society.
However, this was not obvious at the beginning of the transformations because in some
ways the situation had diametrically changed after 1989. State censorship was lifted, and
new distribution channels appeared. The copyright law was implemented in 1994. What
now signified the social  prestige was the legal  access to various kinds of  audiovisual
content, including rentals of DVDs and paid satellite channels. This, to a large extent,
corresponded to the situation in other countries as discussed, among others, by Barbara
Klinger (Beyond the Multiplex). Home audiovisual sets, as well as the collections of DVDs,
constituted a  specific  manifestation of  cinephilia  which was based on access  to both
economic  capital  (the  equipment)  and  cultural  capital  (collecting  films).  What  also
signified prestige was access to TV channels of the premium segment (Canal + or HBO)
available  only  on subscription.  Yet  there  were also pirate  alternatives  even to  these
premium  media—the  informal  circulation  of  films  also  included  the  TV  and  pirate
decoders  were  widely  available  on  the  market.  At  any  rate,  only  recently  did  the
development of terrestrial digital television diminish the interest in satellite and cable
TV,  both  very  popular  in  Poland.  In  2012,  seven  million  Poles  used  paid  satellite
platforms,  while  almost  five  million  had  cable  TV  subscriptions  (Szewczyk).  Despite
access to free channels, a substantial part of the population used satellite or cable TV,
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which makes it difficult to see them as signifiers of prestige. Yet like in the era of the
VCR,  change  occurred  at  the  moment  a  new  solution  cropped  up.  It  again  linked,
unambiguously,  access  to  a  channel  to  access  to  symbolic  capital,  not  necessarily
invoking, in any direct way, the economic status of the viewers.
14 This change was obviously brought about by the internet. At the turn of the century it
was being popularized in Poland and was used by the statistically younger, well-educated
and urban part of the population (Batorski). What is more, the diversity of its uses and
the proficiency of its users who aimed to render their every-day life more efficient were
visibly linked with the amount of the cultural capital the users enjoyed (Filiciak, Mazurek
and Growiec). Due to the development of high-speed connections and new formats of film
coding which enabled  transmission through the  internet,  from the  beginning  of  the
twenty-first century on, new platforms developed facilitating an exchange of files in the
peer-to-peer architecture. Their use—a unique return of the piracy of the VCR era in a
novel  form  detached  from  any  contact  with  intermediaries—was  at  first  primarily
available to educated youth, and, on account of the quality of connections, restricted
mostly to big cities. It was also linked with cultural competences: knowing English or
having the ability to find subtitles with their translation. And although piracy is often
blamed by Polish distributors for impoverishing the official offer, it was at that time that
the  next  generation  understood  that  the  films  downloaded  outside  the  official
distribution channels were more interesting and ambitious than those available in the
cinema and on TV. 
15 The scale of the informal digital internet distribution gradually increased encompassing
around one third of the population (Filiciak, Hofmokl and Tarkowski). Forms of sharing
unauthorized content underwent change, making access more egalitarian. Cda.pl, a web
hosting and media service established in 2003, a phenomenon unique on a world scale, is
a symbol of that change. It allows its users to share films on the internet and access them
through streaming. As is easy to guess, most of the offer violates copyrights even if the
service only provides a platform where films are shared by its users. The service has over
eight million users, which makes it the most popular video sharing platform in Poland
after YouTube. This is an example showing that the current change of the ecosystem of
access to pirate audiovisual content is not only about the forms of content exchange (the
easy  to  use  streaming  rather  than  file  exchange),  but  also  about  the  creation  of
professional services. These services are treading the path paved earlier by the Polish
video game industry. The founders of the world-renowned developing studios such as CD
Projekt or Techland began their careers as sellers of pirate games (see Filiciak). This is
why Cda.pl  is  getting ready to  enter  the stock market  and trying to  sign legitimate
contracts with distributors. What is more, beside the proceeds from commercials, it also
reaps profits from premium subscription. 
16 Pirate distribution can also help, however, to promote new types of content as was the
case  with  informal  screenings  of  Japanese  animations  at  American  campuses.  This
gradually paved the way for the popularity of anime in the US (Jenkins 156-161). Similar
examples can be found in Poland where American TV series of the new generation gained
popularity online first and only later did the official distribution take advantage of it.
Again, the already familiar situation developed: an entire gamut of content which blurred
the dividing line between various formats came to be ennobled through the distribution
channel. 
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3. TV and Intergenerational Tensions
17 Contemporary quality TV, in its TV series version, often linked with The Sopranos by HBO,
constitutes the culmination of the transformations in the American TV industry of the
1980s. It is above all a culmination of the development of satellite TV, the deregulation of
the cable TV market and the establishment of an influential position by networks such as
HBO, which generate profit not from commercials but from subscriptions. In a nutshell:
the progressive segmentation of the viewers gave rise to more productions tailored to
smaller  audiences.  Addressing  their  productions  to  the  relatively  affluent  and  well-
educated portions of the society (not only American), cable TVs began to experiment with
shows which did not shy away from talking about ambiguous situations and controversial
characters, and eagerly played with conventions often breaking moral taboos along the
way. The latter was possible as they were not subject to legal regulations binding for
American open access broadcasters. The development of new technologies which enabled
timeshifting also played a certain role here. In Poland, a groundbreaking show which
initiated the fashion for TV series downloaded from the internet was Prison Break by the
Fox Broadcasting Company. This could be seen as another example of the significant role
of the medium of distribution. Prison Break was not a series comparable in any degree to
the productions from the Fox premium segment. After the internet success, the series
was  bought  by  the  open-access  TV  channel  Polsat  on  which it  enjoyed  immense
popularity. 
18 Again,  we  can  note  a  similar  pattern  here:  the  sense  of  prestige  is  produced  by  a
particular access channel and is then gradually dispelled when access is made egalitarian
and when the content is dispersed through other forms of distribution, such as television
platforms.  And  thus  again,  we  find  in  Poland  a  pirate  version  of  an  American
phenomenon. Jane Feuer, who explores the phenomenon of new generation TV series,
draws on the category of not TV, a category used in the marketing strategies of HBO and
stemming from the slogan: It’s not TV. It’s HBO (154-155). According to Feuer, this slogan
delineates real points of reference for new generation TV series (she refers, for example,
to Six Feet Under, which was promoted as arthouse TV, closer to theatre plays or literature
than traditional series) but also for their inspirations. She argues, ironically, that such
explorations are immanent to television genres. This shift towards the realm of art or
high culture is significant, though. Television, even on the level of the texts it creates and
distributes, no longer fits within what has traditionally been associated with TV. But, for
marketing reasons, it willingly wears and sports this novel garb. It boasts of not being TV
thus creating a new segment of viewers who treat the traditional TV with contempt or as
a form of guilty pleasure. However, in Poland, not TV content ended up in a medium
different from premium channels: pirate internet channels. It thus paved the way for the
emergence of other access platforms, with Netflix at the forefront. 
19 Netflix, an indubitable icon of the transformations of TV, has been available in Polish only
since September 2016. Yet access to Netflix remains elite. During the first months, when
popularity was driven by the one-month free trial,  the service reached the level of a
million subscribers. At the moment, the number reaches 760 thousand (Ula). Again, the
subscribers are mostly young people in big cities (see PS). It seems that what is essential
for the provider to attract a wider audience is not economy (it is common knowledge that
many users, loyal to the Polish tradition of resourcefulness, share their accounts) but
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cultural  competence which manifests itself  in taste.  As Pierre Bourdieu would put it,
“taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier” (6). It is mostly young and educated Poles
aspiring to join the global middle class who seem to be the Netflix audience. Raised in the
EU, they sever themselves from the generation of their parents when it comes to taste
and ways of using new content. According to statistics, the generation of their parents is
less inclined to choose Netflix. For this reason—even if this decision may seem risky—I
treat access to this platform as another sign of changes linked with the specific status of
Netflix. This platform is simultaneously the producer and distributor of the audiovisual
content—it  functions  as  both  the  TV  and  a  digital  medium  which  is  based  on
recommendation algorithms and allows viewers to use the content in a manner closer to
computer data bases than traditional forms of access to audiovisual content. As such, it
fits my discussion of the various modes of access, in which not only the content itself but
also the mode of access (i.e.  the mediation of a given device or service) are of great
importance.
20 From this perspective, Netflix is seen as a database which Lev Manovich describes as a
cultural form, making possible a (re)presentation and (re)configuration of culture in ways
not  possible  before the era of  the computer (218-243).  Yet  as  Jose van Dijck,  among
others,  has  shown,  the  logic  of  a  database  reconfigurable  by  means  of  social  media
permeates nowadays the online sociality, or even sociality as such (Culture of Connectivity).
Such platformed sociality generates concerns among the elderly who see such ways of
building relationships with others as inauthentic (moving boundaries between private,
public and corporate) or self-interested (connectivity can be seen as a resource). What
they also find worrisome is the new logic of creating such social connectivity which the
platformed sociality  enables.  Without  entering into the discussion on the validity  or
invalidity of such opinions, I see in this logic of managing one’s own social networks a
certain break from the logic underlying older types of media. They allowed for a smaller
circle of friends that was more difficult to reconfigure or connect to sub-circles. We can
compare these two types of logic to the difference between the TV and social media. The
former  provided  content  which  could  be  discussed  by  friends  who  met  on  other
occasions;  the latter enabled a swift  and convenient switch of  groups with which an
individual comes to interact. Seen in a broader perspective, the possibilities offered by
social media have political consequences. They enable the construction of thematic and
also hobby-oriented social networks allowing the users to switch from one to another. On
the intergenerational level this leads to identity tensions. It also, in a sense, levels various
aspects of an individual’s life by bringing them all under one common denominator: from
the choice of TV programs to the matter of one’s world view. 
21 This  intergenerational  tension was  brought  to  light  in  an interesting  way thanks  to
Dorota Wellman, a well-known journalist who for almost a decade has been one of the
most recognizable people of the TVN station. Within the Polish TV ecosystem of the last
two decades,  TVN is a station identified with urban audiences,  mostly voting for the
current opposition. Wellman has recently written an open letter to young people blaming
them, in a way similar to the lyrics of the song which open this essay, for giving up on
political resistance in favor of sitting in front of the screen. The title of the text in which
she accused the young of passivity in the face of the threat of new authoritarianism read:
“Does it really make no difference to you in what country you live? Will you awaken when
your Netflix no longer works?”
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22 This symbolic reference to Netflix reveals another division linked to the ways of using TV.
This  time,  however,  it  is  not  about  the  simple  difference  between a  more  or  a  less
prestigious  medium.  Wellman is  a  journalist  who represents  a  broadcaster  seen as  a
mouthpiece  of  the  full-belly  section of  the  generation of  transformations  who are  a
beneficiary of the systemic changes in Poland. It would be difficult to defend the thesis
that she could be envious of those young people in their 20s or 30s who are building their
professional careers in a new, highly precarious environment. Watching productions such
as House of  Cards indicates,  instead,  a consciousness of living in a world of weakened
traditions and disappearing points of reference, both at the level of access to TV and of
more  broadly  understood  patterns  of  behavior  typical  of  a  given  social  group.  It
constitutes  an  element  of  an  identity  performance  eluding  simple  classifications  but
simultaneously corresponding to the conditions in which young people have to function.
The labor market which offers “flexible forms of employment” does not help them to
function according to the traditional TV program format. The Netflix content, convenient
due to easy access but still sophisticated in terms of cultural competence, has become a
method of managing everyday life but also one’s own image by means of the media. As
such,  this  content  resembles  the  processes  of  simultaneously  identifying  with  many
groups which have little in common. It also signifies a unique alliance with the content
provider who demands payment for one’s adaptation to those conditions. Once more, the
Polish intelligentsia feels threatened by media changes because once more they have
received, in the same package offering an attractive content, the tools to reconfigure
social networks and manifest their transformed shape. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Batorski, Dominik. “Wykluczenie cyfrowe w Polsce“. Studia BAS 3(19) (2009): 223-249. Print.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Trans. Richard Nice.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. Print.
Feuer, Jane. “HBO and the Concept of Quality TV“. In: Quality TV: contemporary American television
and beyond. Ed. J. McCabe and K. Akass. London: IB Tauris, 2007. 145-158. Print.
Filiciak, Mirosław, Justyna Hofmokl and Alek Tarkowski. The Circulations of Culture: Mashup. A
Research Report. Warszawa: Centrum Cyfrowe, 2012.
https://obiegikultury.centrumcyfrowe.pl/mashup/?lang=en. Accessed November 12, 2018.
Filiciak, Mirosław, Paweł Mazurek and Katarzyna Growiec. Korzystanie z mediów a podziały
społeczne. Warszawa: Centrum Cyfrowe, 2013.
https://centrumcyfrowe.pl/projekty/korzystanie-z-mediow-a-podzialy-spoleczne/. Accessed
November 12, 2018.
Filiciak, Mirosław. “Playing Capitalism. The Polish People’s Republic, Constructing Memory, and
Video Games.” Widok 11 (2015).
http://pismowidok.org/index.php/one/article/view/314/677. Accessed November 12, 2018.
Will You Awaken When Your Netflix No Longer Works? American Films, Television...
European journal of American studies, 13-3 | 2018
10
Gans, Herbert. Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste. New York: Basic
Books, 1999. Print.
Gaweł, Piotr. “Pierwsza Runda dla Rocky’ego.” Polityka 11 (12 March 1988). Print.
Jenkins, Henry. Convergence Culture. New York: New York University Press, 2008. Print.
Kiossev, Alexandr. “The Self-Colonizing Metaphor”. Atlas of Transformation. 2011.
http://monumenttotransformation.org/atlas-of-transformation/html/s/self-colonization/the-
self-colonizing-metaphor-alexander-kiossev.html. 
Accessed November 12, 2018.
Klinger, Babara. Beyond the Multiplex: Cinema, New Technologies,and the Home. Berkley: University of
California Press, 2006. Print.
Kurz, Iwona. “Telewizja: szyby niebieskie od telewizorów.” Obyczaje polskie. Wiek XX w krótkich
hasłach. Ed. M. Szpakowska. Warszawa: WAB, 2008. Print.
Larkin, Brian. Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructre, and Urban Culture in Nigeria. Durham: Duke
University Press, 2008. Print.
Lewicki, Arkadiusz. “Ilu widzów oglądało ‘bergmany’? Dystrybucja i widownia filmowa w Polsce
wczoraj i dziś—mity i fakty.” Wokół zagadnień dystrybucji filmowej. Ed. M. Adamczak and K. Klejsa.
Łódź: PWSFTviT, 2015. 33-60. Print.
Livingstone, Sonia, and Ranjana Das. “The End of Audiences?: Theoretical Echoes of Reception
Amid the Uncertainties of Use.” A Companion to New Media Dynamics. Ed. J. Hartley, J. Burgess, A.
Bruns. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 104-121. Print.
Manovich, Lev. The Language of New Media. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. Print.
Osiecka, Agnieszka. “Wydeo”. Polityka 22 (3 June 1989). Print.
Philibert, Jean-Marc, and Jourdan, Christine. “Perishable Goods: Modes of Consumption in the
Pacific Islands.” Cross-Cultural Consumption, Global Markets, Local Realities. Ed. David Howes. London:
Routledge, 2004: 55-76. Print.
PS. “Netflix z niestabilną odwiedzalnością w Polsce, maksymalnie 386 tys. użytkowników
miesięcznie.” 2017.
https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/netflix-w-polsce-liczba-uzytkownikow-miesiecznie.
Accessed November 12, 2018.
Sundaram, Ravi. Pirate Modernity. London: Routledge, 2010. Print. 
Szewczyk, Łukasz. “GUS: 4,8 mln abonentów TV kablowej i 6,9 mln użytkowników TV
satelitarnej”. Media2. 2013.
https://media2.pl/media/106695-GUS-48-mln-abonentow-TV-kablowej-i-69-mln-uzytkownikow-
TV-satelitarnej.html. Accessed November 12, 2018.
Ula. “Netflix rośnie w siłę. Coraz więcej abonentów także w Polsce”. Rzeczpospolita. 2018.
https://www.rp.pl/Media-i-internet/310189973-Netflix-rosnie-w-sile-Coraz-wiecej-abonentow-
takze-w-Polsce.html. Accessed November 12, 2018. 
van Dijck, Jose. The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013. Print.
Will You Awaken When Your Netflix No Longer Works? American Films, Television...
European journal of American studies, 13-3 | 2018
11
Wallerstein, Immanuel. “Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis”. Theory
and Society 3.4 (Winter 1976): 461-483. Print.
Zarycki, Tomasz. “The Power of the Intelligentsia: The Rywin Affair and the Challenge of
Applying the Concept of Cultural Capital to Analyze Poland’s Elites.” Theory and Society 38(6)
(2009): 613–648. Print.
ABSTRACTS
This  article  is  devoted to the historical  changes of  the status  of  access  to  American TV and
cinema content in Poland. Using the framework of cultural studies, media are treated here both
as texts and objects. The analysis of case studies from the VHS era as well as of contemporary
online streaming services connects the way people access video content with the production of
social  prestige,  and  shows  how  changing  styles  of  video  consumption  mark  social
transformations in contemporary Poland.
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